Andrea Locatelli and Andrea Carati
Those who feared that Donald Trump would turn US foreign policy upside down in his second term need not have waited long: within hours of his inauguration ceremony, the newly installed President was rushing to sign executive orders that included – among others – withdrawing from the World Health Organization, blocking aid funds and threatening new tariffs on neighbouring Canada and Mexico. And that is just the beginning: looking back at his electoral campaign, the foreign policy vision that emerged from his America First doctrine hailed a revolutionary course in US relations with the world.
Truth be told, it is hard to find meaningful differences from the 2016 platform, and most of the principles remain the same: his transactional policy style, his scepticism toward multilateralism, his self-professed fascination with protectionist policies have not changed an inch. Thus, we argue, a cursory look at his foreign policy approach during his first term can give us some indication of the future course of Trump’s foreign policy.
As we have shown in the pages of The International Spectator, the evidence from his first term (2017-2021) suggests that while Trump often presented himself as a disruptor determined to dismantle globalist institutions, his impact was considerably less transformative than he promised. Contrary to his flamboyant rhetoric, relations with allies (albeit under stress) did not come to an end; nor did he make concessions to competitors like China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. In the end, his foreign policy was characterised by erratic decision-making, personal diplomacy and an inconsistent commitment to traditional alliances. In other words, Donald Trump diverted US foreign policy from some of its fundamental principles, but he ultimately failed to change its course.
What explains Trump’s mixed record on foreign policy? Domestic constraints, such as bureaucratic resistance, congressional oversight and entrenched institutional norms, played a role in limiting the President’s ability to enact radical change. For instance, the foreign policy establishment thwarted his attempts to withdraw from NATO, reduce overseas troop deployments and radically shift alliances. Congress also imposed significant checks on Trump’s foreign policy: bipartisan support for sanctions against Russia, restrictions on arms sales and resolutions against abrupt troop withdrawals prevented Trump from fully implementing his America First agenda. In particular, as we have argued elsewhere, the President was tamed in his most revolutionary efforts by his inner circle of advisers. The so-called “adults in the room” (then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, National Security Advisors H.J. MacMaster and John Bolton, former Chief of Staff John Kelly and, perhaps most importantly, Secretary of Defence John Mattis) developed active strategies to insulate the President from radical influences (for example, from the alt-right), to offset his unilateral impulses and reassure allies.
However, Trump also implemented counterstrategies to gain the upper hand over opposing forces. With regard to the State Department, he did not hesitate to use his funding prerogatives to weaken bureaucratic opposition. He also left key positions vacant, thereby adding strategic displacement to defunding. Most importantly, he changed personnel, especially in top positions, at an unprecedented rate. By the end of his first term, this turnover allowed him to surround himself with yes-men who were more interested in competing with each other than challenging the President’s whims.
In his second term, Trump seems to have learnt the lesson well: his foreign policy team (Rubio, Hegseth, Waltz, Wiles) lacks the expertise, standing and interest needed to effectively oppose the President. Moreover, the Republican majority in Congress, at least until the mid-term elections, gives the President more room to manoeuvre than before. All this raises two uncomfortable scenarios: would Trump be able to fully implement this America First doctrine? Or, freed from any constraints, would he behave without a clear strategy, thereby exacerbating the chaos that has characterised his past presidency? For America’s allies – and for the stability of the international order – neither of these scenarios is good news.
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